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Abstract 
Entrepreneurs evaluate opportunities under conditions of uncertainty; they make judgments. 
In order to understand these evaluations, I develop an analogical model that represents an 
entrepreneurial opportunity in the mind of an individual. The model proposes that an opportunity 
is an analogical knowledge transfer from a source business domain to a target business domain. 
According to the model, the cognitive distance between the domains influences the opportunity 
evaluation. Additionally, the inspiration behind the analogy construction influences the 
opportunity evaluation. The empirical design employs a hypothetical scenario experiment and 
the results show that the two analogical properties matter for evaluation. 
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Introduction 
 “[W]e need to know how the business world is represented in the cognitions of people who do, and 
people who do not, found new ventures.” (Shaver and Scott, 1991) 
How representations of the business world form in an individual’s mind is a central cognitive puzzle 
for entrepreneurship research (Grégoire et al., 2011). Before an entrepreneur founds a firm, an 
opportunity is only an idea in his or her mind. The opportunity, which is the novel business idea, is 
represented using the individual’s existing knowledge structures (Baron, 2006). A positive subjective 
evaluation of the idea reflects the construction of the belief that prospective customers will pay more than 
the associated costs for a novel product or service (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000) and sets off a chain 
of events that form the basic building blocks in the economy (Busenitz et al., 2003; Mahoney and 
Michael, 2005). Constructing such an opportunity evaluation requires a difficult judgment call (McMullen 
and Shepherd, 2006), however. A cognitive answer to the difficulties of opportunity evaluation relies, 
partly, on the way the opportunity is represented in the mind of the person making that judgment. This 
study thus examines that larger question: How does the representation of a novel business idea in the 
mind of an individual influence the evaluation of the idea? 
Several well-known venture histories illustrate the complexity of opportunity evaluation. For 
example, when its founder started Netflix, almost all the routines of the envisioned firm had been in 
practice in different industries for a long time. Many did not believe in the profit potential of the idea, 
however. Similarly, the founder of Amazon.com faced a difficult time at the beginning; others could not 
comprehend the idea of combining mail-order businesses with the internet. The opportunity evaluation 
problem is not only about missed opportunities (Hogarth and Karelaia, 2012), it can also be about 
overconfidence (Simon and Shrader, 2012). For instance, in the case of Webvan, an online grocery 
business, the entrepreneurial idea received strong support from virtually all the stakeholders involved. 
The idea of transferring the Amazon.com model to groceries made sense to both entrepreneurs and 
investors. With the advantage of hindsight, we can fashion explanations for the differences in observed 
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performance. The critical evaluation of the opportunity occurs before the firm is organized and the 
outcomes are observed, however. Thus we need to understand how the individual constructs the 
opportunity in her mind at the time of entrepreneurial judgment (Dimov, 2007b). 
Since Shaver and Scott pointed out the representation puzzle a couple of decades ago, 
entrepreneurship research has made only scattered advances toward understanding how an opportunity is 
represented in the mind (e.g. Sarasvathy, 2001). The literature addresses this fundamental question by 
focusing mostly on individual traits and capabilities rather than the opportunity idea (Dahlqvist and 
Wiklund, 2012). A few recent investigations, however, examine the knowledge structures that prospective 
entrepreneurs employ as they imagine the opportunities they evaluate (Grégoire et al., 2011). Mitchell et 
al. (2002), for example, propose that entrepreneurs use scripts as they recognize, evaluate, and exploit 
opportunities. Relying on a different knowledge structure, the prototype, Baron and Ensley (2006) 
maintain that prospective entrepreneurs use pattern recognition when they compare events around them 
with what they believe an opportunity ought to be. In a recent study, Grégoire and Shepherd (2012) model 
opportunities as technology-market combinations. These studies pioneered the use of knowledge 
structures as models of opportunity representation in the individual’s mind.  
The complexity of the entrepreneurial judgment task allows individuals to use all of these knowledge 
structures simultaneously, and our understanding of the entrepreneurial mind at the time of opportunity 
evaluation is yet incomplete. Existing models rely on either special knowledge structures that are too 
specific to the entrepreneurial task or ambiguous concepts that are difficult to reconcile with other 
knowledge-based theories of business phenomena (c.f. Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). Entrepreneurial events are infrequent; therefore, a cognitive explanation of entrepreneurial 
judgment will be grounded only if it employs a generic cognitive mechanism that is possessed not only by 
some special individuals (c.f. Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005). In addition, entrepreneurs rely heavily on prior 
business knowledge as they think about novel opportunities (Shane, 2000; Ward, 2004); therefore, the 
cognitive mechanism of choice also needs to demonstrate how a new idea can be represented using 
existing business knowledge in a person’s mind. A structured review of the entrepreneurial cognition 
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research reaches a similar conclusion: We need to identify the cognitive elements relevant to 
entrepreneurship and the cognitive mechanisms that operate on them (Grégoire et al., 2011). 
Building on and extending the entrepreneurial cognition literature, I advance a model of opportunity 
representation using a generic cognitive mechanism (i.e., analogy) and an established theory of 
knowledge representation in a firm (i.e., routines). The resulting analogical model contributes to the 
entrepreneurship literature a novel theory of envisioning opportunities while offering an intuitive 
explanation of how business knowledge can be re-used to imagine a new firm organization. “Nothing 
comes from nothing” is a common theme in many philosophical systems. Cognitive science research 
shows that we use knowledge structures to represent existing knowledge and operate cognitive 
mechanisms on them to learn and to create new ideas (Holyoak and Thagard, 1995). The theoretical 
model advanced in this study contributes to the investigation of analogical mechanisms in 
entrepreneurship research, which is in its very early stages (e.g. Cornelissen and Clarke, 2010; Grégoire 
and Shepherd, 2012; Ward, 2004). In addition, the empirical study contributes an experimental design that 
exploits the inference power of a controlled study in the context of a complex business phenomenon (cf. 
Billinger et al., 2014; Loch et al., 2013).  
Theoretical background 
The theoretical model developed in this study articulates an analogical representation of an 
entrepreneurial opportunity in the mind of the individual. The variation of interest is the evaluation of 
opportunity; hence, the immediate interpretation of the findings contributes to the opportunity evaluation 
literature (c.f. Haynie et al., 2009; McMullen and Shepherd, 2006). In doing so, the model builds on the 
convergence of two established theories in neighboring fields to entrepreneurial cognition: analogy from 
cognitive sciences (e.g. Gentner et al., 2001; Hofstadter, 2001; Holyoak and Thagard, 1995) and routines 
from the knowledge-based theory of the firm (e.g. Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
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Subjectivity of opportunity evaluation 
Individuals’ evaluations of the profit potential of an idea, which depends on the future satisfaction of 
customers’ needs, are subjective and heterogeneous (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003; Knight, 1921; Mahoney 
and Michael, 2005; McMullen and Shepherd, 2006). Existing literature on entrepreneurial opportunities, 
however, does not provide us with many tools to explain that variation. Most promising personality traits, 
such as attitude towards risk, locus of control, and need for achievement, hardly explain entrepreneurial 
behavior (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003; Krueger Jr and Reilly, 2000; Shook et al., 2003). Influential 
Austrian economics perspectives, which emphasize the subjectivity of opportunity evaluation, do not 
provide a clear answer either. Schumpeter (1934) characterizes the entrepreneur as a daring and 
innovative person, but his work does not include a distinctive decision-making framework (Kesting, 
2007). Kirzner (1997) points to alertness as a key cognitive characteristic, but empirical support for his 
view is lacking (Busenitz, 1996). After surveying the literature, Dimov (2004) concludes that the 
subjectivity of the entrepreneurial process requires understanding the opportunity from the entrepreneur’s 
perspective, but that “no existing definition of opportunity captures an entrepreneur’s view of it” (p. 148).  
Following that critique, entrepreneurial cognition research has progressed toward understanding how 
an opportunity may exist in the prospective entrepreneur’s mind. A few recent studies show how 
individuals could structure their prior knowledge as they construct opportunities in their minds. First, 
Mitchell and colleagues (2000) employ cognitive scripts as the knowledge structure of choice. Scripts are 
knowledge structures in an individual’s mind that are related to frequently experienced occasions. The 
classic example is the restaurant script: Individuals know how to interact in restaurants with the staff in 
order to be served. Mitchell et al. (2000) identify the scripts possessed by entrepreneurs and differentiate 
them from other individuals. As an alternative, Baron and Ensley (2006) employ prototypes as the 
knowledge structure of choice. Prototypes are cognitive constructs that represent ideal forms. For 
example, a person might have a prototype for an apple, which is a knowledge structure in her mind. 
Whenever she has a potential apple object in her sight, she compares the object to the prototype. If it is a 
match, she decides that the object is an apple. Applying this concept, Baron and Ensley (2006) suggest 
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that entrepreneurs also have a prototype for "business opportunity." More recently Grégoire and Shepherd 
(2012) present the results of a study that employed structural alignment as a cognitive mechanism of 
organizing prior knowledge structures in the mind. In their theoretical development, the researchers 
model an opportunity as a techonology-market combination. They then explain how opportunities differ 
in terms of the match between the attributes of a technology and the attributes of a market. Their results 
show that entrepreneurs are sensitive to that heterogeneity in opportunities. These research studies 
provide excellent justification and impetus for the entrepreneurial cognition field. 
Opportunity representation is a complicated cognitive puzzle, and several other cognitive processes 
are expected to be simultaneously involved in addition to scripts, prototypes, and structural alignment. To 
make the case for an alternative cognitive mechanism, the next sub-section builds the case for the 
distinctive element in an entrepreneurial opportunity--novelty--and how that novelty is identified. 
Defining a Novel Opportunity in the Context of Routines  
An entrepreneurial opportunity differs from the larger set of all profit opportunities because of its 
newness (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). An opportunity is novel in an entrepreneurial sense if it 
requires a new framework for making decisions (Langlois, 1982). If, in contrast, an opportunity’s 
potential can be evaluated using existing frameworks, then it requires a form of decision making like that 
of a producer as an economic agent in a neoclassical sense (Adaman and Devine, 2002; Foss and Klein, 
2012). 
To understand what makes an entrepreneurial opportunity novel, we need to be able to compare the 
new with the old (Rosenkopf and McGrath, 2011), which can be a difficult task (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). 
First, we need to understand the existing knowledge from which the novel idea is deviating (Michael, 
2007). Strategy research provides tools to help explain existing knowledge in firms. Evolutionary 
economics and knowledge-based theories recognize that a firm is composed of employees’ repeated 
activities (Grant, 1996; Kesting, 2007; Loch et al., 2013), and thus it becomes a repository of collective 
knowledge or a collection of sequenced activities (Kogut and Zander, 1992). These firm-level capabilities 
are analogous to the skills of an individual. Nelson and Winter (1982) define them as routines. By 
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suggesting the founding of a new firm, an entrepreneurial opportunity implies one or more routines that 
do not yet exist in practice; rather, at this stage, they exist only in an individual’s mind. In this sense, they 
are novel routines. An entrepreneurial opportunity therefore incorporates a knowledge proposition 
(Harper, 1996) that consists of a set of routines applied in a novel setting (Kaul, 2013). 
Although researchers have traditionally considered routines as firm-level constructs, they also relate 
to other levels of analysis. At the macro level, for example, routines play an important role in economic 
change. As blocks of knowledge, routines represent the “genes” that carry over from one organization to 
others (Kogut and Zander, 1992). At the micro level, routines have cognitive counterparts: scripts (see 
Journal of Management Studies, December 2012 Special Issue for a thorough examination). Cognitive 
science research has demonstrated that an individual stores scripts as chunks in his or her mind (Abelson 
and Black, 1986; Sharkey, 1986). In fact, Nelson and Winter (1982) suggest that the terms “script,” 
“routine,” and “program” have been used to represent the same concept. When evaluating an 
entrepreneurial opportunity, the individual imagines a firm organization accomplishing a set of routines 
that will materialize if he or she decides to found the firm. The routine construct is useful for opportunity 
representation in this cognitive sense of a script. Entrepreneurial cognition research has shown that 
entrepreneurs use scripts in many stages of new venture development (Mitchell et al., 2002). As the 
entrepreneur contemplates on an opportunity, she consults script-like knowledge structures that represent 
the routines of the future venture she will start.  
Thus, the following conceptual aspects emerge. An entrepreneurial opportunity: (1) consists of one 
or more routines (that is, knowledge structures that show how to perform the steps necessary to 
accomplish a business goal); (2) proposes that a routine will be applied in a novel setting (such that it 
becomes a novel routine); and (3) contains the expectation that profits will emerge because it will satisfy 
a customer need. 
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Representation of the novel opportunity as analogy: Model and Hypotheses 
According to cognitive theories of analogy, creation of the new is only possible through the old. On a 
superficial level, novelty is a change of a convention, an existing practice. More precisely, an 
entrepreneurial opportunity is the consequence of a novelty generation mechanism in the mind of an 
individual. Gentner (1983: 156) defines analogy as “an assertion that a relational structure that normally 
applies in one domain can be applied in another domain.” As Hofstadter (2001) eloquently conveyed it, 
an analogy is “the very blue that fills the whole sky of cognition” (p. 499). Through analogy, an 
individual adapts a piece of knowledge that works in one domain to a new domain (Holyoak and Thagard, 
1995).  
Cognitive science researchers have identified analogical thinking as a fundamental process through 
which individuals create and learn new knowledge (Gentner, Holyoak and Kokinov, 2001). Studies 
demonstrate the mind’s use of analogy in processes ranging from child learning to scientific discovery 
(Holyoak and Thagard, 1995). Ward (2004) raised the idea that entrepreneurial opportunities may also be 
the consequence of an analogical mechanism, but a structured modeling of an opportunity as an analogy 
has not yet been completely developed (see Cornelissen and Clarke, 2010; Grégoire et al., 2010a for 
pioneering studies with related agendas). 
Hence, the central argument in this paper is the following: An opportunity may be represented as an 
analogical proposition in the mind of the individual. The prospective entrepreneur proposes that he or she 
can apply a routine that normally satisfies a need in one domain to another domain. This, in turn, is 
expected to satisfy another need and bring forth profits. More formally, we can describe an existing 
business as: Routine-X satisfies Need-A (see Figure 1). Let Domain-1 denote the business that will 
function as the source domain. Let Domain-2 denote a business in which Routine-Y satisfies Need-B. 
That will be the target domain. 
One way to construct the analogy is to observe that Need-A is similar to Need-B. If Domain-1 is 
analogous to Domain-2, then the “satisfies” relationship should hold in both. Therefore, the individual 
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concludes that Need-B will be satisfied by Routine-X (the upward arrow in Figure 1). The transfer of the 
routine from one domain to another produces an entrepreneurial opportunity. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
The knowledge components in the analogy construction above require further elaboration. At least 
two domains are necessary to construct an analogy. In the entrepreneurial analogy construction, each 
domain consists of a customer need and a routine to satisfy it. It is important to separate the customer 
need from the way it is satisfied (Michael, 2007), and therefore, I define need as a condition requiring 
relief. For the purposes of the theoretical development here, I consider needs exogenous and beyond the 
influence of the entrepreneur.  
In contrast, a routine specifies how a need is satisfied. The actual routine employed by an existing 
firm is not a cognitive object of interest, however, nor is the actual need of a particular customer group. 
Instead, the mind of the individual is the level of analysis, and our concern is about how an 
entrepreneurial opportunity is represented in an individual’s mind. The schemas containing the routines 
and the needs in the entrepreneur’s mind form the building blocks of the analogy that give rise to an 
entrepreneurial opportunity. Therefore, I define a routine as a knowledge structure in an individual's 
mind, such that a sequence of actions will produce a particular outcome. This definition of the routine 
relies on a knowledge structure equivalent to scripts (Mitchell et al., 2002; Smith et al., 2009b); however 
differs from them by its knowledge. Previous script research in entrepreneurial cognition have examined 
knowledge of how to create a new company. By routines in this context, I focus on the domain knowledge 
of how a particular business works. We can conceive of a routine as the first component of a means-ends 
framework, such that the participants accomplish a goal within a business transaction through the 
execution of some actions in a certain sequence. 
There are two possible paths for the analogy. In the first path, the individual focuses on the existing 
need in the source domain and discovers another domain that involves a similar customer need. She 
observes that Need-A is similar enough to Need-B. Even though the existing routines might seem very 
9 
different from each other, she makes the judgment that she can transfer one routine to the other domain. 
Let us call such analogies Need-inspired opportunities. The upward arrow in Figure 1 above represents 
this type of analogy construction. 
In the second path, the individual discovers the second domain based on the similarity between the 
two routines. In contrast to the first case, she starts with the observation that the two routines are similar 
enough. Even though the needs satisfied by these two routines seem very different, she makes the 
judgment that the existing routine will satisfy the second need. Let us call such analogies Routine-
inspired opportunities. The downward arrow in Figure 2 represents this type of analogy construction. The 
crucial judgment about the similarity of the domains is either Need-inspired or Routine-inspired. These 
are the two types of analogy constructions available to the individual. They generate the same opportunity 
(Routine-X will satisfy Need-B) in the end but via different paths.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
According to cognitive theories of analogy, three factors affect an analogy’s success: superficial 
similarities between the two domains, mappings of structural relationships, and the purpose of the 
analogy (Thagard, 1992). Gentner (1983, 1989) emphasizes structural mapping as the most important 
factor. Grégoire et al. (2010) apply Gentner’s theory in the context of opportunity recognition by 
executive entrepreneurs and show that structural properties indeed make a difference. In contrast, 
Holyoak and Thagard (1995) emphasize the third factor, purpose. The purpose of the analogy builds on 
the fact that the individual is looking for a solution to a problem when she constructs the analogy. 
Analogies that fit well with the purpose will be more powerful than those that do not. I apply Holyoak 
and Thagard’s theory to explain and predict which types of analogies will be favored in the case of 
entrepreneurial judgment. When the analogy is successful, it might also register as a match with the 
entrepreneur’s opportunity prototype (Baron, 2006). 
While making an entrepreneurial judgment, an individual constructs and considers the belief that 
others will pay for a novel product or service. This purpose relies heavily on the premise that others have 
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a need that the new routine will satisfy. I anticipate that the emphasis on the business purpose will be a 
cause of variation in individuals’ evaluations of different types of opportunities. In the case of Need-
inspired opportunities, the prospective entrepreneur has a significant advantage in predicting a business's 
viability. She has access to the knowledge that some potential customers exist with a proven need, which 
a novel routine can better satisfy. Even when the underlying structural properties are different, a surface-
level similarity of the needs will lead to an easier analogical transfer (Gary et al., 2012). Having that 
knowledge will decrease uncertainty about the opportunity’s profit potential since perceived uncertainty 
of the demand will be lower. Thus, individuals will perceive the analogy as more successful, because it 
better satisfies the purpose constraint.   
In contrast, in the case of Routine-inspired opportunities, the individual has access only to the 
knowledge that two routines are similar. She then extrapolates through analogy that the needs would be 
similar as well. Even though a given technology, or a routine, can be transferred to a wide variety of 
domains, the choice sets that entrepreneurs actually consider are relatively small (Gruber et al., 2013). 
The cognitive leap in the Routine-inspired case is a more uncertain one since the purpose of the analogy 
heavily relies on others with an established need. Therefore, in the case of Routine-inspired opportunities, 
the uncertainty associated with the customer need will be the cause of a more negative evaluation and less 
likely to register as a match with the entrepreneur’s opportunity prototype (Baron and Ensley, 2006). This 
yields the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Individuals will evaluate need-inspired opportunities more positively than routine-
inspired opportunities. 
An entrepreneurial opportunity encompasses two domains: a source domain and a target domain. 
The conceptual distance between these two domains is the second dimension on which opportunities vary 
(see Figure 3). Some opportunities represent a significant departure from the source domain while others 
are closer (cf. Ward, 2004). For illustration, let us consider the flat-fee payment routine of a movie rental 
business (such as Netflix) as the source analog. An individual creates one entrepreneurial opportunity 
when he or she transfers this routine to another domain, such as books. An individual creates a different 
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entrepreneurial opportunity when he or she transfers that routine to the designer bags domain. These two 
opportunities are both Routine-inspired opportunities in the sense that the individual identifies the source 
routine first and subsequently discovers a customer need. However, they differ in the cognitive distance 
dimension. We may reasonably conjecture that the cognitive distance between the books domain and the 
movie rental domain is smaller than the distance between the designer bags domain and the movie rental 
domain. That difference corresponds to the difference in the length of the arrows in Figure 3. For that 
reason, the latter opportunity represents a larger cognitive leap from the source analog and therefore 
incurs larger uncertainty. Thus, I define the domain similarity construct as the cognitive distance between 
the two domains of the analogy underpinning the entrepreneurial opportunity. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
According to analogy theory, an increase in cognitive distance causes doubt in the analogy’s success 
(Holyoak and Thagard, 1995). The face validity of analogical mapping is weaker when the domains are 
significantly different from each other. Even the similarity of simple characteristics of the domains plays 
an important role in the evaluation of analogies (Grégoire and Shepherd, 2012; Holyoak and Thagard, 
1995). In human cognition, analogy works as a cognitive mechanism because we believe in the 
performance of the source analog. After establishing the correspondence between the source and target 
analogs, we conjecture that the routine will also work in the target domain (Gentner, 1983). If the transfer 
implies a significant leap between the domains, however, then the analogy’s success becomes doubtful. 
We expect the skills associated with one domain to lose their value if they are transferred to other 
domains (Negro and Leung, 2012).  
This general cognitive reasoning relates particularly well to entrepreneurial judgment. The more 
distant the domain to which an individual transfers a routine, the less useful existing data become for the 
individual. The entrepreneur has more difficulty imagining the necessary actions for effective firm 
operation (Knight, 1921) and the potential outcomes in a distant domain (Langlois, 1982). The existing 
routines of the source domain do not readily apply in the context of the target domain. In these 
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circumstances, the entrepreneur would recognize that the source routines would have to adapt in order to 
produce the desired outcomes in the target domain. That adaptation would influence the evaluation of the 
opportunity as it might fail to provide a viable pattern that looks like a complete opportunity prototype in 
the target domain. When the domains are distant, the different circumstances might disturb the match 
between the routine and the need, which might result in weaker pattern matching between the evaluated 
opportunity and the prototype in the mind of the individual (Baron and Ensley, 2006). As a result, the 
individual is likely to experience more doubt about the success of the analogy and hinder the decision to 
pursue the venture. Thus, the individual will evaluate the distant opportunity more negatively. In contrast, 
in the case of a similar domain, the individual will perceive the existing data to be more useful as the 
source routine can be transferred to the target domain without significant transformation. This yields the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. Domain similarity will relate positively to evaluation of an opportunity. 
Method 
In testing the validity of the analogical representation of opportunities, the major methodological 
challenge stems from bridging two distinct scientific disciplines in a single empirical study. Most 
empirical studies in cognitive sciences employ simple tasks, such as completing an analogy missing a 
word. In contrast, entrepreneurship and management disciplines are interested in highly abstract and 
complex phenomena (Hill and Birkinshaw, 2010). The gap between the methods employed by the hard 
sciences and the phenomenon of interest in management research brings forth the issue of experimental 
realism (Patel and Fiet, 2010). Below I explain how the cognition experiment was designed to match the 
complex research question in entrepreneurship (Acs et al., 2010) and how various threats to causal 
inference were addressed. The solutions offered in this section may serve as a template for researchers 
who design experimental studies in entrepreneurship (see also Loch et al., 2013 for a similar study). 
Prominent reviews of the literature recommend experimental studies for entrepreneurial cognition 
research (Baron and Ward, 2004; Grégoire et al., 2011; Mitchell et al., 2004; Mitchell et al., 2007). By 
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providing real-time data, experiments help overcome problems related to self-reporting, retrospective 
reporting, and survival biases (Choi and Shepherd, 2004). In contrast, the unmeasured variables problem 
is unavoidable in survey methods due to the complexity of the subject. The only way to capture 
uncertainty about the future is to study the decisions “live,” as they occur (Dimov, 2004). Individuals 
should think, not recall, for accurate results. Therefore, I used a hypothetical scenario experiment to test 
the conceptual model proposed in this study (e.g. Haynie et al., 2009; Loch et al., 2013; Sarasvathy et al., 
1998). 
I conducted the experiment over the course of two semesters in a computer laboratory that holds 
about 20 participants at a time using a web-based delivery system. Benefits of this delivery system 
include improved accessibility, complete random ordering of the stimuli, and better measurement of the 
dependent variable (Schade and Burmeister, 2009). First stage of the experiments was a pre-test with 315 
participants to validate the instruments as explained in detail below and the second stage was the main 
study with 359 participants to test the hypotheses. Both samples consisted of undergraduate students in 
business administration at a major university in the Midwestern United States. Using students as 
participants is a common practice in previous studies of a similar nature (e.g. Billinger et al., 2014; Loch 
et al., 2013). Participation was voluntary, and the students received extra credit for a course in return for 
their participation in, but not completion of, the study. The guidelines required that students would 
receive credit irrespective of their performance in the task.  
In the experiment, I presented each participant with three scenarios, each of which included a 
hypothetical entrepreneurial opportunity (see Appendix A). Scholars sometimes treat laboratory studies, 
especially those that use students, with apprehension in terms of external validity. Previous research, 
however, shows that a blanket statement about the external validity of laboratory studies is not grounded. 
The theoretical model does not assume entrepreneurial experience; instead, it focuses on how individuals 
make judgments before they start ventures similar to the students who made the judgments that led to 
Microsoft, Facebook, Google, and FedEx.  
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The strength of experiments in causal inference 
Ideally, a full factorial within-subject design would be employed to test the hypotheses. Each 
participant would receive all of the treatments, which should be valid and reliable reflectors of the 
empirical constructs (Dyer et al., 2008). A repeated measures ANOVA test would be sufficient to 
measure the fixed effects. However, since no previous study modeled an opportunity as an analogy I had 
to create the scenario instruments, on which subsequent studies could build. Therefore, significant threats 
to construct validity, especially in the form of instrument validity and reliability, arose (Patel and Fiet, 
2010). In a perfect experiment, all alternative explanations other than the independent variables should be 
eliminated so that internal validity is achieved. The causal inference is the most important advantage of an 
experimental methodology (Cook et al., 1979); therefore, in the following section, I describe these threats 
to validity (see Table 1), as well as the design refinements made to address them.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
As instruments for each condition, researchers can use two types of scenarios: attribute-driven 
profiles or actual case-derived scenarios (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999). I use the latter kind because 
they are specific, whereas general attributes of domain and routine similarity would not make sense to a 
participant without proper training in the theory. Training of the participants would bias them in favor of 
the hypotheses, however. In contrast, vignette-like short scenarios are specific to a situation and are easier 
to answer truthfully (Loch et al., 2013; Robertson and Anderson, 1993). 
Scenario development and pretest experiment 
According to the theoretical model, individuals can construct the analogy in two alternative ways: 
routine-inspired and need-inspired. In the need-inspired version of an opportunity, the individual first 
identifies a problem and then makes a connection to an existing business that could provide a solution. In 
the routine-inspired version of the same opportunity, the individual first identifies an existing business 
that she appreciates and then makes a connection to a problem she has. Except for the order of events, the 
two versions of the scenarios are identical. Such a minor difference between the two scenarios decreases 
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the power of the manipulation and the likelihood of detecting a significant effect; however, given the 
construct validity concerns, this is necessary to establish causality in interpreting the findings. In 
summary, each scenario has a source domain and a target domain (Di and Dj). Once the domain pairs were 
chosen in a scenario, they automatically determined the magnitude of the similarity construct for that 
particular opportunity. More than 60 pairings were identified as potential instruments. 
The fact that there were no previous data on the instruments’ validity made a separate pretest study 
compulsory. Therefore, I conducted a study with a separate sample of 315 undergraduate business 
students to capture the participants’ perceptions. Participants read a subset of the scenarios and answered 
questions corresponding to the two independent variables: need/routine inspiration and cognitive distance. 
At the end of each session, I held a discussion session with the participants so that they could elaborate on 
their understanding of the opportunities. 
The Need/Routine manipulation had the intended effect about 75% of the time. In other words, after 
reading the scenarios, participants identified whether the opportunity was inspired by the need or by the 
routine correctly 75% of the time. The amount of time spent reading the scenarios had a significant effect 
on the probability that the manipulation worked as intended. Since participants received credit only for 
participating in the experiment (and not for the quality of their participation), not all were motivated to 
pay attention to the subtle cues in the scenarios. The choice of a subtle treatment reduces the power to 
detect an effect; however, it substantially improves our confidence in the causal interpretation. The 
sample scenarios in Appendix A are almost identical word by word. A statistically significant between-
subjects difference can be confidently attributed to the causal effect of the analogical properties because 
of the intricate design of the experiment that is described in the next section. 
Three separate questions captured the participants’ similarity evaluations. The first question was 
asked after they read each scenario. After participants identified the source domain and the target 
domain, they were asked to state how similar these two domains were to each other. For each (Di , Dj) pair 
shown to the participant, a similarity rating was collected on a 4-point Likert scale (very dissimilar – 
slightly dissimilar – slightly similar – very similar). The second similarity question appeared after they 
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evaluated all scenarios. A manifestation of the cognitive distance construct is the applicability of the 
source routine in the target domain without significant transformation. When the domains are similar, the 
routine can be transferred rather easily; but when the domains are distant, the routine might have to 
transform significantly. In order to capture that insight, I asked participants to pick a manager for the 
business among five candidates with five different professional backgrounds. They ranked each candidate 
according to how useful his or her experience would be for the focal business. For each (Di , Dj) pair 
shown to the participant, a similarity rating was collected as the average rank among the five alternatives. 
Finally, the third question was asked to elicit a direct similarity evaluation of all possible (Di , Dj) 
combinations. Participants ranked each business simply in terms of its similarity to the focal business. 
The average rank was calculated for each combination. 
I aggregated the data and determined cut-off points to differentiate among domain pairs. For some 
scenarios, there was convergence between the three similarity questions. For example, it was apparent 
that the “jewelry” domain and the “watch” domain created a “similar” condition. In contrast, “movies” 
and “paintings” domains created a “distant” condition. For some others, answers did not converge. For 
example, the distance between “tuxedo” and “watch” varied greatly based on how similarity was 
measured. These domain combinations were not appropriate instruments and thus were excluded from the 
main study. At the end of this pretest experiment, I chose the three most discriminating scenarios per 
condition to use in the main study as the treatments. Two other experts, one familiar with the theory and 
the other unfamiliar with the theory but knowledgeable about the method, verified the coding of the 
scenarios. 
Internal validity 
Recall bias. Using a limited set of domains in several conditions maximizes the internal validity of 
the findings. To address the potential for recall bias that might arise due to re-using the domains, I 
incorporate some constraints. First, once I used a domain as a target in a scenario, the participant could 
not see it again for the rest of the experiment. For instance, after I asked a person for his evaluation of the 
“online watch rental” business, he could not see the same business as a source domain for another 
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condition. Since it had already been portrayed as a hypothetical business, the credibility of the 
opportunity that uses “online watch rental” as a source would be questionable. Second, I did not use the 
same business as a target more than once. Even if the source domain was a different one, the participant’s 
evaluation could not be an independent observation, because he already had evaluated the “online watch 
rental” idea. Third, once I used a domain as a source in a scenario, I did not subsequently use it as a target 
in a different scenario. I thus implemented a sophisticated delivery system to ensure that none of the 
above constraints was violated. As a part of this delivery system, the scenarios were presented to 
participants in a random order so that there was no ordering effect. 
Attention bias. Because of the above constraints and the cognitive load on participants, it was 
impractical to expose a participant to more than three scenarios. That resulted in missing cells in a 3x2 
within-subject design. The alternative between-subject design would result in the loss of valuable 
information. As an economizing solution, I implemented a mixed design with incomplete cells. I treated 
each independent variable as a within-subject variable, albeit separately. In this economizing solution, the 
online delivery system made sure that every participant was exposed to every level of the independent 
variables. In other words, each participant evaluated one similar, one moderate, and one distant scenario, 
while making sure that at least one of these scenarios was need-inspired and one was routine-inspired. 
Instrument reliability. Since this was the first time that these scenarios were used, I could not be 
fully confident that the findings would be the consequence of the independent variables. It is possible that 
the choice of a particular domain in a scenario could create the effect. For instance, the opportunity for the 
“online jewelry” business might get high evaluations simply because people like shiny objects. Therefore, 
I used multiple scenarios for each condition. Recall that after conducting the pretest experiment that 
focused on the scenario validation, I identified the most discriminating three scenarios to serve as 
treatments for each condition. Figure 4 below depicts the implementation details. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
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In summary, the experiment had the 3x2 design illustrated in Figure 4. Each group was implemented 
with the following constraints: (1) Domain Similarity was a within-subject variable (that is, each group 
had one Similar, one Moderate, and one Distant scenario); (2) Inspiration was a within-subject variable 
(that is, each group had at least one Need-inspired and one Routine-inspired scenario); and (3) When a 
business domain was used as a target, it did not recur in any other scenario for that group. 
Manipulation checks 
The manipulation check for the Inspiration variable is relatively straightforward. After each 
scenario, the participants answered three questions that asked in different ways whether the scenario was 
a need-inspired scenario or a routine-inspired scenario. If the manipulation does not induce the 
independent variable, it is unreasonable to expect it to have effects on evaluation. Even if there are 
effects, they will not be due to the predictor variable. All three manipulation check questions had only 
two possible answers (corresponding to need-inspired or routine-inspired options). Additionally, two 
attention check questions asked the participant to identify the domains mentioned in the scenarios they 
read. Inability to recall this information accurately would impair the participant’s judgment of the 
opportunities. 
Results below in Table 3 report two levels of manipulation checks. A strict manipulation check that 
required accurate results for all attention and manipulation check questions removed 174 participants out 
of the analysis. The participants who did not pass the manipulation check did not differ from those who 
passed in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, or major. The guidelines of the behavioral lab required that the 
participants receive the course credit solely for participation and this was made very clear to them during 
all stages of the experiment. The lack of incentives to pay attention to the subtle stimuli used in this 
experiment might be a reason for the failure rate (Oppenheimer et al., 2009). Table 3 also reports 
consistent results when only those who passed the simple attention check are included (85% of the 
sample). 
Recall that after the pretest, I assigned each scenario to the Similar, Moderate, or Distant condition. 
As a check of that manipulation, I asked each participant to rate the similarity of all available domain 
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pairs in the main study as well. I asked these questions after the participants finished evaluating all the 
scenarios in order not to confound the dependent variable. Results show that the first level of the Domain 
Similarity manipulation worked as predicted. Participants did not perceive the distinction between 
Moderate and Distant conditions, however, even though these two categories collectively were 
significantly differentiated from Similar scenarios. Therefore, I aggregated the evaluations of the last two 
conditions into one. After creating a new condition that is simply the average of the last two conditions, 
the revised design for the purposes of the analysis had only two levels: Similar and Distant. 
Dependent and control variables 
Evaluation is the outcome of the initial entrepreneurial judgment under investigation in this study. It 
corresponds to the end of the first stage in the two-stage entrepreneurial action model developed by 
McMullen and Shepherd (2006). At this stage, the prospective entrepreneur recognizes that there exists a 
potentially profitable business opportunity associated with a particular idea, but the person has not yet 
decided whether to pursue the opportunity. McMullen and Shepherd denote this stage of entrepreneurial 
action as the third-person opportunity. Accordingly, I measured Evaluation from a third-person 
perspective, focusing on the opportunity itself. This is in contrast to asking the participant to speculate 
about starting a business herself or himself. Such priming would invoke individual effects that would 
confound the results and would not take advantage of the laboratory experiment, which can precisely 
focus on the intended dependent variation (Schade and Burmeister, 2009). 
To measure Evaluation, I used three separate 5-point Likert items. After reading each scenario, the 
participants answered the following questions: “How attractive do you think the entrepreneurial 
opportunity described in this scenario is?” [1: Not attractive at all; 5: Very attractive], “How would you 
predict the success of a company based on this opportunity?” [1: Very unprofitable; 5: Very profitable], 
and “How likely would you recommend Barbara Johnson to start a business based on this opportunity?”  
[1: Definitely not recommend; 5: Definitely recommend]. The questions are from a third-person 
perspective in the sense that the participant is not burdened by having to weigh starting this business 
herself or himself. 
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Dependent variable questions are intended to capture an underlying Evaluation construct. A principal 
component analysis shows that these three questions indeed capture one underlying variation. The first 
component captures 85% of the total variation of the three variables. The component score coefficients of  
the dependent variables were 0.35, 0.36, and 0.37. In other words, each variable contributed equally to the 
component. In addition, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy was 0.746, suggesting 
that there might be underlying factors. Finally, Bartlett’s test of sphericity refuted the null hypothesis very 
strongly (approx. chi-square: 22,248; df: 3; p-value: 0.000). Therefore, I calculated a single Evaluation 
score for each opportunity for each participant. The single dependent variable rating is a simple average 
of the three variables. Running all of the analyses reported below using the factor loadings does not 
change the results, nor does running all of the analyses reported below for each individual dependent 
variable question change the results. 
The benefit of designing the experiment such that the independent variables are within-subject 
variables is that it eliminates alternative explanations for the findings. This in turn reduces the import of 
control variables that are common in survey methods. For the purposes of post-hoc analyses, however, I 
include the following control variables used in similar studies. I measure prior knowledge of the business 
domains, the most widely used explanation in the literature to explain entrepreneurial judgment (e.g. Furr 
et al., 2012; Michael and Combs, 2008; Shane, 2000), using four items adapted from Grégoire 
(2005:191). I measure prior entrepreneurial activity by the numbers of firms the participants had founded, 
of start-ups they were involved with as an employee, of entrepreneurship programs completed, and of 
courses related to entrepreneurship taken. Because Netflix’s business model is used as a source domain in 
many scenarios, the participant’s prior experience with it is also measured with dummy variables 
(awareness of the business, awareness of the website, familiarity with some customers, being a customer). 
Finally, I also measure the individual’s risk-taking propensity using nine items taken from Weber, Blais, 
and Betz (2002). 
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Results 
The average age of the 179 participants who passed the manipulation check in the study is 20.2; 55% 
of them are male; and 65% of them reported Caucasian ethnicity. 72% of them reported majoring in an 
area of business. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the key variables in this study. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Test of hypotheses 
The complexity of the experimental design has dividends in the simplicity of the data analysis. I 
tested the hypotheses using repeated measures ANOVA. The theoretical model proposes that if 
opportunities can be represented as analogies in the mind of the individual, then the two analogical 
properties of the opportunities may matter in terms of how individuals evaluate them. Alternatively, if 
analogy construction does not matter, then there should be no difference in the evaluation of an 
opportunity based on a difference in analogy construction. For instance, participants should evaluate the 
online art rental opportunity described in Appendix A, regardless of its construction, as a need-inspired 
opportunity or a routine-inspired opportunity. The scenarios are almost identical except for the 
protagonist’s inspiration to construct an analogy. In contrast, if the analogical model matters, Hypothesis 
1states that participants will perceive Need-inspired opportunities as less uncertain analogies and hence 
judge them more positively. In parallel, the cognitive distance between the source and the domain should 
matter only if the individuals relate to the analogical construction. Otherwise, Barb’s Art Rental is the 
same opportunity regardless of what domain the original inspiration comes from. Hypothesis 2 proposes 
that individuals will be sensitive to that cognitive distance and judge similar opportunities more positively 
than distant ones.  
The results show that Similar opportunities are indeed evaluated more positively than Distant ones. 
In the first subsample with strict manipulation checks, Similar opportunities received a rating of 3.153 out 
5, whereas Distant opportunities received a rating of 2.851. ANOVA results show that the difference is 
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statistically significant (F[178] = 14.849; p = .000). A robustness check by comparing only the non-
aggregated Distant opportunities show consistent results (F[178] = 13.645; p = .000). Likewise, in 
support of Hypothesis 2, participants rated Need-inspired opportunities more positively than Routine-
inspired opportunities. The Need-inspired opportunities have a mean rating of 3.043, whereas the latter 
mean is 2.846 (F[178] = 6.935; p = .009).  
The results are reasonably sensitive to the manipulation checks1. Second row of Table 3 reports the 
results when 85% of the sample, who answered only the attention checks accurately, is included in the 
analysis. Both hypotheses are strongly supported in this case as well. When the entire sample is used in 
the analysis, hypothesis 1 is marginally supported (p = .069) and hypothesis 2 is strongly supported (p = 
.005). 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
In post-hoc analyses, most control variables did not show any effects on opportunity evaluation. 
Notably, prior founding experience or prior entrepreneurship education did not have any influence. On the 
other hand, gender turned out to be the most interesting variable in post-hoc analyses. This study did not 
theorize any differences in opportunity evaluation based on gender; however, it is significantly correlated 
with many other variables. Females evaluated almost all types of opportunities, except routine-inspired, 
more positively than males. A cursory explanation is the difference in attitudes between genders. More 
interestingly, this difference cannot be based on risk-taking attitudes because females scored significantly 
below males in terms of their propensity to accept risks. This result is consistent with findings from recent 
studies on optimism (Hmieleski and Baron, 2009), though the question of why females would be more 
optimistic than males in opportunity evaluation remains available for future research. 
                                                     
1 The dilution of statistical significance as more of the sample is included in the analysis is revealing. Even 
though increasing the sample size increases the power of a statistical test, the p-values decrease in this case. When I 
test the hypotheses on those who answered the manipulation checks inaccurately, neither hypotheses receive support 
(p-values > 0.79). Thus, the dilution of the significance can be attributed to whom the manipulation did not induce 
the desired effect. This fosters my confidence in the causality uncovered by the experiment. 
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Discussion 
Not all opportunities are the same, and their heterogeneity matters for their judgment. That statement 
may seem intuitive; but scholarly literature on entrepreneurship has not yet focused on that variation 
satisfactorily (Grégoire and Shepherd, 2012). Most research to date focuses on the individual traits, the 
entrepreneurial process, or the outcomes of this process. Opportunity is also a central construct in 
entrepreneurship (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000), and this study advances the literature by enriching its 
conceptualization (Short et al., 2010). Recent efforts to focus on the opportunity ideas themselves, as 
opposed to their outcomes, hint at why it has been difficult to do so (e.g. Dahlqvist and Wiklund, 2012; 
Samuelsson and Davidsson, 2009; Smith et al., 2009a). We are not even certain where to look for the 
epistemological underpinnings of an opportunity when it is only an idea, a vision (Alvarez and Barney, 
2010). 
Philosophical problems notwithstanding, there is a concrete fact that entrepreneurs and their 
investors must deal with continuously: Novel ideas, such as those behind Google, Netflix, and Amazon, 
are difficult to judge. In novel circumstances, there are no historical data to form the basis for accurate 
predictions, and therefore, entrepreneurs encounter uncertainty (Knight, 1921), which leads to hesitancy 
and doubt, blocking action (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006). As an uncertainty resolution mechanism, 
entrepreneurs, investors (Cornelissen and Clarke, 2010), and managers (Gary et al., 2012; Gavetti et al., 
2005) use analogy in communication, yet this study is the first to explore the formal analogical 
representation of opportunity ideas from the perspective of the entrepreneur’s mind. 
The findings on analogy presented in this study identify two ways in which opportunities differ that 
have not been previously explored: the inspiration behind the idea and the cognitive distance between the 
domains. The analogical model presented in this study complements existing theories in several ways. 
First, the analogy model utilizes another instance of cognitive scripts, as the image of the firm routines in 
the mind of the individual are conceptualized as scripts. This complements previous research, which 
demonstrates that entrepreneurs invoke and enact cognitive scripts as they act entrepreneurially (Smith et 
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al., 2009b). The prospective entrepreneur stores the firm routines in a given domain in the memory and 
compares them as she makes similarity judgments. Based on the correspondence between these two sets 
of events, she reaches some conclusions. The ability to construct analogies is shared by all individuals, 
not only experienced entrepreneurs (Hofstadter, 2001). Further research on entrepreneurial scripts can 
investigate how individuals use them to construct analogies. 
Second, the analogy model contributes another instance of the pattern recognition mechanism, 
complementing the prototype research, which demonstrates that entrepreneurs compare the set of events 
to their prototype of an entrepreneurial opportunity (Baron and Ensley, 2006). The prospective 
entrepreneur is recognizing an opportunity when a routine is transferred over to a new business domain to 
satisfy a need. The success of prototype matching may depend on the properties of the analogy 
construction. If the domains are too distant or if the opportunity is motivated by the routine, the individual 
may be less likely to register a match to the prototype. Further research on opportunity prototypes could 
investigate the effects of analogical properties on pattern recognition. 
Finally, there are significant complementarities between the models of structural alignment and 
analogy presented in this paper. According to the analogical model in this study, an opportunity is a 
routine-need combination brought together in a business domain. The finding that the cognitive distance 
between two domains negatively influences an opportunity’s evaluation helps contextualize the findings 
of Grégoire and Shepherd’s (2012) recent study. These researchers were concerned, for example, that 
entrepreneurs had trouble overlooking superficial dissimilarities in order to see the structural similarities. 
The findings in this study can help explain that tendency. Superficial dissimilarities between the domains 
may have increased the cognitive distance between those domains. Highly innovative opportunities 
(Samuelsson and Davidsson, 2009) might utilize structural similarities which might also contain 
superficial dissimilarities (Grégoire and Shepherd, 2012).  The evidence presented here regarding the 
inspiration behind the analogy can help alleviate that valid concern. If the entrepreneurs construct the 
analogy from a need-based inspiration, they are more likely to evaluate it positively. In these cases, once 
the entrepreneurs recognize the opportunity, they will be better served by adopting a need-inspired 
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communication strategy using metaphors and other linguistic devices based on the needs of the customers 
in the target domain (Cornelissen and Clarke, 2010). 
The experimental design in this study assumed the analogical representation of opportunities and did 
not test whether opportunities can also be represented in the mind using other cognitive mechanisms. Due 
to the complexity of the cognitive tasks associated with entrepreneurial behavior, however, all of the 
knowledge representation models are likely to exist in the mind simultaneously. Furthermore, there may 
be patterns in the type of opportunities and the cognitive mechanisms. For instance, analogy may capture 
the nature of some opportunities, e.g. Webvan, better than others, e.g. Microsoft. An intriguing research 
agenda would be to examine how these cognitive mechanisms can coexist in the mind of the entrepreneur 
regarding one particular opportunity. 
The finding that the evaluation of opportunities depends on their analogical properties provides 
further evidence supporting a cognitive approach to examine entrepreneurial judgment (Corbett, 2005; 
Grégoire et al., 2011). However, it does not inform us about the effects of individual characteristics or the 
outcomes of the ventures based on these analogies. An individual characteristic such as alertness, for 
example, might be influential in identifying analogies between distant domains (Gaglio and Katz, 2001). 
Although this study did not focus on differences among individuals, further studies might investigate how 
individuals differ in their tendencies to construct and believe in analogies. An explanation could be built 
around optimistic disposition, for example. Prospective entrepreneurs’ optimism may allow them to have 
confidence in analogies that may lead to unsuccessful outcomes (Hmieleski and Baron, 2009). Although 
the post-hoc analysis in this study did not show any differences based on participants’ previous 
entrepreneurial experience, further theory development is needed on its effect on analogy construction 
and evaluation of opportunities. Future research could investigate the confluence of individual factors and 
environmental conditions on analogy construction and success. 
Boundary conditions 
The dependent variable in this study is the third-person evaluation of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
That implies that the opportunity is already formulated by or for the individual. Therefore, the findings of 
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this study do not reveal immediate insights about the discovery of opportunities. Furthermore, positive 
evaluation is a necessary but insufficient condition for behavior. Hence, the interpretation of the findings 
should take the additional stages between evaluation and action into account. It is safe to assume, 
however, that action will not occur unless the individual makes a positive evaluation of an opportunity. 
An important assumption underpinning both the theory and the empirical instruments in this study is 
that the opportunity germinates from a single novel idea. Even though there is considerable face validity 
to this assumption, there may be cases in which the opportunity is a combination of several ideas 
simultaneously. Findings of this study are bound by those opportunities in which the individual can 
identify a single analogy as the core idea behind the opportunities. Furthermore, this study did not 
consider whether the routines needed to transform as they were carried to a target domain in order to 
satisfy the target need more effectively. The adaptability of the source routine to the target domain could 
be a predictor of success for the venture that is built on an analogical transformation. An opportunity for 
further research exists in modeling that transformation as knowledge from one domain is carried over to 
another domain to create an entrepreneurial opportunity.  
Finally, during the testing of the hypotheses, the participants learned about and evaluated 
opportunities during a relatively short period in the laboratory. Although an experimental setup can 
resemble entrepreneurial decision making because of its ability to isolate the variables of interest (Schade 
and Burmeister, 2009), the findings are still based on the initial evaluations. It is conceivable that 
individuals might modify their evaluations as they think about the opportunities for a longer time or as 
more information becomes available (Dimov, 2007a; Uygur and Kim, 2013). The corroboration of the 
hypotheses in this study is particularly relevant to explain the “intuition” or “gut feeling” many 
entrepreneurs and researchers mention. Further research could investigate how sticky the initial 
evaluations are for the time spanning the entrepreneurial process and beyond (Michael, 2002). 
Practical implications 
A noteworthy practical implication of this study is that understanding the construction of 
opportunities as analogies can help generate new opportunities. The section on the development of 
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hypothetical scenarios can serve as a preliminary template for potential entrepreneurs and senior 
managers to discover new opportunities. Constructing analogies in order to discover entrepreneurial 
opportunities in turn has further implications. Being aware of the discovery mechanism of the 
opportunity, for example, can help entrepreneurs see the shortcomings of their ideas. Awareness might 
lead entrepreneurs to refine their intuitive judgments and identify weaknesses. For instance, if there is a 
structural difference between the domains, the transferred knowledge is more likely to fail (Gentner, 
1983; Grégoire et al., 2010a). Cognitive processes are highly personal to the individual, and the results of 
this study support the contention that potential entrepreneurs should understand the underpinning 
mechanisms. 
Analogy is a universal cognitive mechanism shared by all, and thus analogy can help entrepreneurs 
better communicate their justifications for new business ideas to investors and other stakeholders. Others 
are more likely to understand the opportunity and relate to the entrepreneur when they can follow the 
implicit thought process behind the opportunity. Returning to the well-known entrepreneurial stories that 
opened this text, the analogical properties of these opportunities might have played role in their 
evaluation. The cognitive distance between the analogs were too distant for the Netflix opportunity: The 
flat-fee payment routine of the gym did not resemble the payment routine of the video rental stores, nor 
did mail-order business resemble retail business. Similarly for Amazon, the cognitive distance between 
bookstores and communication over the internet was simply too large for others to evaluate the 
opportunity positively. In contrast, Webvan had a very strong analogical story to tell in transferring the 
online business routines to satisfy grocery needs and was able to gather significant interest in the 
opportunity. 
This study shows that substantial cognitive distances between the domains lead to lower evaluations. 
Likewise, opportunities that are inspired by routines correlate with lower evaluations. It is uncertain, 
however, whether these low evaluations are predictors of low future performance. It would be in the best 
interest of potential investors to understand their own cognitive biases involved in reaching a judgment. 
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Conclusion 
Cognitive studies rely on hypothetical scenario experiments because they offer certain advantages, 
such as significant face validity and the capacity to exert strong causal arguments. Entrepreneurial 
cognition research, however, has not adopted this methodology extensively (Grégoire et al., 2010b). The 
methodology used in this study thus can serve as a template demonstrating the validity of using 
hypothetical scenarios in entrepreneurship research (cf. Grichnik et al., 2010; Loch et al., 2013). This 
paper identifies several threats to internal validity posed by this method and provides solutions for use in 
further research. The results of this study can serve as a basis for further empirical cognitive studies in 
entrepreneurship research by providing a method to connect low-level cognitive phenomena, such as 
analogical processes, to high-level business concepts, such as entrepreneurial opportunity. 
The accessibility of cognitive science methods and theories can help entrepreneurship researchers 
tackle difficult but central puzzles (Baron, 2004; Grégoire et al., 2011; Krueger, 2003). A central puzzle 
addressed in this study is the representation of the opportunity in the mind of the prospective entrepreneur 
(Shaver and Scott, 1991). The organization of prior business knowledge in the mind is a theme that 
resonates with recent advances in the social science literature. Strategic management research has long 
inquired about the role of knowledge in firm existence and sustainability (Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 
1992; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Particularly in recent years, there is an interest in understanding the 
cognitive foundations of this knowledge (e.g. Journal of Management Studies December 2012 Special 
Issue; Bingham and Kahl, 2013; Eggers and Kaplan, 2013). It is not surprising that the knowledge 
structure question is also a central one for cognitive scientists. In particular, the representation of novel 
ideas using prior knowledge has been a focus (Gentner et al., 2001; Thagard, 1992). When a novel idea 
takes the form of an opportunity to generate profits through a firm organization, the representation 
problem becomes central to entrepreneurship research. We need to address the question of how 
businesses emerge (Rumelt, 1987), using the perspective of the individual who envisions the business 
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(Dimov, 2004). The convergence of strategic management, cognitive science, and entrepreneurship 
research on the puzzle of opportunity representation promises an answer to this important question. 
An entrepreneurial opportunity signifies a new means-ends relationship (Busenitz, et al., 2003; 
Eckhardt and Shane, 2003; Shane, 2004). In this study, I provide a cognitive model of that relationship, 
which has been lacking despite the wide usage of the term in previous research. Relying on the 
knowledge-based view of the firm, I conceptualize the relationship as a routine satisfying a customer 
need. An entrepreneurial opportunity indeed signifies a new means-ends relationship, because it suggests 
a new routine-need combination that starts as a knowledge proposition in the entrepreneur’s mind and can 
culminate in a firm organization. By demonstrating that analogical properties matter to opportunity 
evaluation, the empirical results of this study contribute to our understanding of the entrepreneurial 
judgment puzzle in the mind of the entrepreneur.   
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APPENDIX A  
Sample Scenario (Source: Netflix, Target: Art Paintings, Need-Inspired) 
Barb’s Art Rental 
Barbara Johnson lives in New York City. She has recently received a promotion in the company that 
she had been working for and she makes a comfortable income. As she plans to re-decorate her apartment 
she realizes that she doesn’t find the expensive paintings that hang on the walls very interesting anymore. 
She paid large sums for each painting. She doesn’t think that she can afford to get rid of them and buy 
new ones from the local fine art store or the museum shop. As she thinks about that problem she stumbles 
upon a business idea. 
What if it was possible to rent expensive art for long periods of time and exchange it when you get 
bored? The business would be similar to Netflix.com, which offers movies for rent. The customers of 
Netflix.com pay a flat monthly membership fee. They order the movies online and receive them in the 
mail. They get to keep the movies as long as they want. Whenever they need to get a new item, they 
simply mail the movie back to the firm. Then, Netflix.com sends the customer another movie he or she 
wanted.  
Barbara thinks about the potential of a similar business for paintings. The customers would order the 
paintings from an online website and receive them by special delivery. They would keep them on display 
at home as long as they wanted at a flat monthly membership fee. When they wanted new paintings they 
would order them from Barbara’s store, which would pick up the old paintings and deliver the new ones. 
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Sample Scenario (Source: Netflix, Target: Art Paintings, Routine-Inspired) 
Barb’s Art Rental 
Barbara Johnson has lived in New York for ten years. She has been renting movies from Netflix.com 
for a year now. The customers of Netflix.com pay a flat monthly membership fee. They order the movies 
online and receive them in the mail. They get to keep the movies as long as they want. Whenever they 
need to get a new item, they simply mail the movie back to the firm. Then, Netflix.com sends the 
customer another movie he or she wanted. 
Barbara was impressed with the idea and started thinking about other situations in which she could 
apply the same model. She remembered the trouble she went through in decorating her new apartment. 
One problem was the commitment to the expensive fine art to hang on the walls. She visited many local 
art stores and museum shops before she could decide on which paintings to buy. 
What if it was possible to rent expensive art for long periods of time and exchange it when you get 
bored? The customers would order the paintings from an online website and receive them by special 
delivery. They would keep them on display at home as long as they wanted at a flat monthly membership 
fee. When they wanted new paintings they would order them from Barbara’s store, which would pick up 
the old paintings and deliver the new ones. 
 
* I created about sixty hypothetical opportunities to use in the experiment. At the time of the 
experiment, a business like Barb’s Art Rental did not exist. As of 2014, there is at least one business, 
TurningArt, which provides the service. Incidentally, Netflix is mentioned as an inspiration in the 
descriptions of that business. 
  
32 
REFERENCES 
Abelson R.P., Black J.B. Introduction. In: Galambos J.A., Abelson R.P., Black J.B. editor editors. 
Knowledge Structures. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates; 1986. p. 1-20. 
Acs Z., Audretsch D., Desai S., Welpe I. On experiments in entrepreneurship research. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization 2010;76:1-2. 
Adaman F., Devine P. A reconsideration of the theory of entrepreneurship: A participatory approach. 
Review of Political Economy 2002;14:329-355. 
Alvarez S.A., Barney J.B. Entrepreneurship and Epistemology: The Philosophical Underpinnings of the 
Study of Entrepreneurial Opportunities. The Academy of Management Annals 2010;4:557-583. 
Baron R.A. The cognitive perspective: a valuable tool for answering entrepreneurship's basic “why” 
questions. Journal of Business Venturing 2004;19:221. 
Baron R.A. Opportunity recognition as pattern recognition: How entrepreneurs "connect the dots" to 
identify new business opportunities. The Academy of Management Perspectives 2006;20:104-119. 
Baron R.A., Ensley M.D. Opportunity recognition as the detection of meaningful patterns: Evidence from 
comparisons of novice and experienced entrepreneurs. Management Science 2006;52:1331-1344. 
Baron R.A., Ward T.B. Expanding Entrepreneurial Cognition's Toolbox: Potential Contributions from the 
Field of Cognitive Science. Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice 2004;28:553-573. 
Billinger S., Stieglitz N., Schumacher T.R. Search on Rugged Landscapes: An Experimental Study. 
Organization Science 2014;25:93-108. 
Bingham C.B., Kahl S.J. The Process of Schema Emergence: Assimilation, Deconstruction, Unitization 
and the Plurality of Analogies. Academy of Management Journal 2013;56:14-34. 
Busenitz L.W. Research on Entrepreneurial Alertness. Journal of Small Business Management 
1996;34:35-44. 
Busenitz L.W., West Iii G.P., Shepherd D., Nelson T., Chandler G.N., Zacharakis A. Entrepreneurship 
Research in Emergence: Past Trends and Future Directions. Journal of Management 2003;29:285-308. 
Cook T.D., Campbell D.T., Day A. Quasi-experimentation: Design & analysis issues for field settings. 
Houghton Mifflin Boston; 1979. 
Corbett A.C. Experiential learning within the process of opportunity identification and exploitation. 
Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice 2005;29:473-491. 
Cornelissen J.P., Clarke J.S. Imagining and Rationalizing Opportunities: Inductive Reasoning and the 
Creation and Justification of New Ventures. The Academy of Management Review 2010;35:539-557. 
Csikszentmihalyi M. Creativity : flow and the psychology of discovery and invention. New York: Harper 
Collins Publishers; 1996. 
33 
Dahlqvist J., Wiklund J. Measuring the market newness of new ventures. Journal of Business Venturing 
2012;27:185-196. 
Dimov D. Beyond the single-person, single-insight attribution in understanding entrepreneurial 
opportunities. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 2007a;31:713-731. 
Dimov D. From Opportunity Insight to Opportunity Intention: The Importance of Person-Situation 
Learning Match. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 2007b;31:561-583. 
Dimov D.P. The Individuality of Opportunity Recognition: A Critical Review and Extension. In: Butler 
J.E. editor editors. Opportunity Identification and Entrepreneurial Behavior. Greenwich, Conn.: 
Information Age Publishing; 2004. 
Dyer J.H., Gregersen H.B., Christensen C. Entrepreneur Behaviors, Opportunity Recognition, and the 
Origins of Innovative Ventures. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 2008;2:317-338. 
Eckhardt J.T., Shane S.A. Opportunities and entrepreneurship. Journal of Management 2003;29:333-349. 
Eggers J.P., Kaplan S. Cognition and Capabilities. The Academy of Management Annals 2013;7:293-
338. 
Foss N.J., Klein P.G. Organizing entrepreneurial judgment: a new approach to the firm. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press; 2012. 
Furr N.R., Cavarretta F., Garg S. Who Changes Course? The Role of Domain Knowledge and Novel 
Framing in Making Technology Changes. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 2012;6:236-256. 
Gaglio C.M., Katz J.A. The psychological basis of opportunity identification: Entrepreneurial alertness. 
Small Business Economics 2001;16:95-111. 
Gary M.S., Wood R.E., Pillinger T. Enhancing mental models, analogical transfer, and performance in 
strategic decision making. Strategic Management Journal 2012;33:1229-1246. 
Gavetti G., Levinthal D.A., Rivkin J.W. Strategy making in novel and complex worlds: the power of 
analogy. Strategic Management Journal 2005;26:691-712. 
Gentner D. Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy. Cognitive Science 1983;7:155-170. 
Gentner D., Holyoak K.J., Kokinov B.N. The analogical mind : perspectives from cognitive science. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 2001. 
Grant R.M. Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Strategic Management Journal 1996;17:109-
122. 
Grégoire D. Opportunity acknowledgement as a cognitive process of pattern recognition and structural 
alignment. United States -- Colorado: University of Colorado at Boulder; 2005. 
Grégoire D.A., Barr P.S., Shepherd D.A. Cognitive processes of opportunity recognition: The role of 
structural alignment. Organization Science 2010a;21:413-431. 
Grégoire D.A., Corbett A.C., McMullen J.S. The cognitive perspective in entrepreneurship: An agenda 
for future research. Journal of Management Studies 2011;48:1443-1477. 
34 
Grégoire D.A., Shepherd D.A. Technology-market combinations and the identification of entrepreneurial 
opportunities: An investigation of the opportunity-individual nexus. Academy of Management Journal 
2012;55:753-785. 
Grégoire D.A., Shepherd D.A., Schurer Lambert L. Measuring Opportunity-Recognition Beliefs. 
Organizational Research Methods 2010b;13:114. 
Grichnik D., Smeja A., Welpe I. The importance of being emotional: How do emotions affect 
entrepreneurial opportunity evaluation and exploitation? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 
2010;76:15-29. 
Gruber M., MacMillan I.C., Thompson J.D. Escaping the Prior Knowledge Corridor: What Shapes the 
Number and Variety of Market Opportunities Identified Before Market Entry of Technology Start-ups? 
Organization Science 2013;24:280-300. 
Harper D.A. Entrepreneurship and the market process: an enquiry into the growth of knowledge. London, 
UK: Routledge; 1996. 
Haynie J.M., Shepherd D.A., McMullen J.S. An Opportunity for Me? The Role of Resources in 
Opportunity Evaluation Decisions. Journal of Management Studies 2009;46:337-361. 
Hill S.A., Birkinshaw J.M. Idea Sets: Conceptualizing and Measuring a New Unit of Analysis in 
Entrepreneurship Research. Organizational Research Methods 2010;13:85-113. 
Hmieleski K.M., Baron R.A. Entrepreneurs' optimism and new venture performance: A social cognitive 
perspective. Academy of Management Journal 2009;52:473-488. 
Hofstadter D.R. Analogy as the core of cognition. In: Gentner D. editor editors. The analogical mind: 
Perspectives from cognitive science. 2001. p. 499-538. 
Hogarth R.M., Karelaia N. Entrepreneurial Success and Failure: Confidence and Fallible Judgment. 
Organization Science 2012;23:1733-1747. 
Holyoak K.J., Thagard P. Mental leaps : analogy in creative thought. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 1995. 
Kaul A. Entrepreneurial Action, Unique Assets, and Appropriation Risk: Firms as a Means of 
Appropriating Profit from Capability Creation. Organization Science 2013. 
Kesting P. Why Innovations Have to Overcome Routine. History of Economic Ideas 2007;15:137-156. 
Kirzner I.M. Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach. 
Journal of Economic Literature 1997;35:60-85. 
Knight F.H. Risk, uncertainty and profit. Harper Torchbooks The Academy library, TB 1215P. New 
York, NY: Harper & Row, 1965; 1921. p. lxiv, 381-lxiv, 381. 
Kogut B., Zander U. Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities, and the Replication of 
Technology. Organization Science: A Journal of the Institute of Management Sciences 1992;3:383-397. 
Krueger Jr N.F., Reilly M.D. Competing Models of Entrepreneurial Intentions. Journal of Business 
Venturing 2000;15:411-432. 
35 
Krueger N.F., Jr. The Cognitive Psychology of Entrepreneurship. In: Audretsch D.B. editor editors. 
Handbook of entrepreneurial research: An interdisciplinary survey and introduction. Boston; Dordrecht 
and London: Kluwer Academic; 2003. 
Langlois R.N. Subjective Probability and Subjective Economics. New York, NY: C. V. Starr Center for 
Applied Economics; 1982. 
Loch C.H., Sengupta K., Ahmad M.G. The Microevolution of Routines: How Problem Solving and Social 
Preferences Interact. Organization Science 2013;24:99-115. 
Mahoney J.T., Michael S.C. A subjectivist theory of entrepreneurship. In: Alvarez S.A., Agarwal R., 
Sorenson O. editor editors. Handbook of Entrepreneurship Research: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. New 
York, NY: Springer; 2005. p. 33-55. 
McMullen J.S., Shepherd D.A. Entrepreneurial action and the role of uncertainty in the theory of the 
entrepreneur. Academy of Management Review 2006;31:132-152. 
Michael S.C. Time To Discovery: The Role of Time in the Entrepreneurial Discovery Process. Business 
Ethics Quarterly 2002;Ruffin Series 3:157-161. 
Michael S.C. Transaction cost entrepreneurship. Journal of Business Venturing 2007;22:412-426. 
Michael S.C., Combs A.G. Entrepreneurial failure: The case of franchisees. Journal of Small Business 
Management 2008;46:73-90. 
Mitchell R.K., Busenitz L., Lant T., McDougall P.P., Morse E.A., Smith J.B. The Distinctive and 
Inclusive Domain of Entrepreneurial Cognition Research. Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice 
2004;28:505-518. 
Mitchell R.K., Busenitz L.W., Bird B., Gaglio C.M., McMullen J.S., Morse E.A. et al. The central 
question in entrepreneurial cognition research 2007. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 2007;31:1-27. 
Mitchell R.K., Smith B., Seawright K.W., Morse E.A. Cross-cultural cognitions and the venture creation 
decision. Academy of Management Journal 2000;43:974-993. 
Mitchell R.K., Smith J.B., Morse E.A., Seawright K.W., Peredo A.M., McKenzie B. Are entrepreneurial 
cognitions universal? Assessing entrepreneurial cognitions across cultures. Entrepreneurship Theory & 
Practice 2002;26:9-32. 
Negro G., Leung M.D. “Actual” and Perceptual Effects of Category Spanning. Organization Science 
2012;24:684-696. 
Nelson R.R., Winter S.G. An evolutionary theory of economic change. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press; 1982. 
Oppenheimer D.M., Meyvis T., Davidenko N. Instructional manipulation checks: Detecting satisficing to 
increase statistical power. Journal of experimental social psychology 2009;45:867-872. 
Patel P.C., Fiet J.O. Enhancing the internal validity of entrepreneurship experiments by assessing 
treatment effects at multiple levels across multiple trials. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 
2010;76:127-140. 
36 
Robertson D.C., Anderson E. Control System and Task Environment Effects on Ethical Judgment: An 
Exploratory Study of Industrial Salespeople. Organization Science 1993;4:617-644. 
Rosenkopf L., McGrath P. Advancing the Conceptualization and Operationalization of Novelty in 
Organizational Research. Organization Science 2011;22:1297-1311. 
Rumelt R. Theory, Strategy, and Entrepreneurship. In: Teece D.J. editor editors. The Competitive 
Challenge: Strategies for Industrial Innovation and Renewal. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger; 1987. p. 137-
158. 
Samuelsson M., Davidsson P. Does venture opportunity variation matter? Investigating systematic 
process differences between innovative and imitative new ventures. Small Business Economics 
2009;33:229-255. 
Sarasvathy D.K., Simon H.A., Lave L. Perceiving and managing business risks: differences between 
entrepreneurs and bankers. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 1998;33:207-225. 
Sarasvathy S.D. Causation and effectuation: toward a theoretical shift from economic inevitability to 
entrepreneurial contingency. The Academy of Management Review 2001;26:243-263. 
Sarasvathy S.D., Dew N. New market creation through transformation. Journal of Evolutionary 
Economics 2005;15:533-565. 
Schade C., Burmeister K. Experiments on Entrepreneurial Decision Making. Now Publishers Inc; 2009. 
Schumpeter J.A. The theory of economic development: An inquiry into profits, capital, credit, interest, 
and the business cycle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1934. 
Shane S. Prior knowledge and the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities. Organization Science 
2000;11:448-469. 
Shane S., Venkataraman S. The promise of entrepreneurship as a field of research. Academy of 
Management Review 2000;25:217-226. 
Sharkey N.E. A Model of Knowledge-Based Expectations in Text Comprehension. In: Galambos J.A., 
Abelson R.P., Black J.B. editor editors. Knowledge Structures. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates; 1986. p. 49-70. 
Shaver K.G., Scott L.R. Person, Process, Choice: The Psychology of New Venture Creation. 
Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice 1991;16:23-45. 
Shook C.L., Priem R.L., McGee J.E. Venture Creation and the Enterprising Individual: A Review and 
Synthesis. Journal of Management 2003;29:379-399. 
Short J.C., Ketchen D.J., Shook C.L., Ireland R.D. The concept of “opportunity” in entrepreneurship 
research: Past accomplishments and future challenges. Journal of Management 2010;36:40. 
Simon M., Shrader R.C. Entrepreneurial actions and optimistic overconfidence: The role of motivated 
reasoning in new product introductions. Journal of Business Venturing 2012;27:291-309. 
37 
Smith B.R., Matthews C.H., Schenkel M.T. Differences in Entrepreneurial Opportunities: The Role of 
Tacitness and Codification in Opportunity Identification. Journal of Small Business Management 
2009a;47:38-57. 
Smith J.B., Mitchell J.R., Mitchell R.K. Entrepreneurial Scripts and the New Transaction Commitment 
Mindset: Extending the Expert Information Processing Theory Approach to Entrepreneurial Cognition 
Research. Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice 2009b;33:815-844. 
Thagard P. Conceptual revolutions. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; 1992. 
Uygur U., Kim S.M. Epiphany and Evolution: How Does Entrepreneurial Judgment Change with Time? 
Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research 2013;33:22. 
Ward T.B. Cognition, creativity, and entrepreneurship. Journal of Business Venturing 2004;19:173-188. 
Weber E.U., Blais A.-R., Betz N.E. A domain-specific risk-attitude scale: measuring risk perceptions and 
risk behaviors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 2002;15:263-290. 
 
 
  
38 
TABLE 1. Threats to Causal Inference 
Threat to causality Explanation  Solution 
Construct validity The scenarios might not represent the 
domain similarity levels as intended  
Conducted a pretest experiment to 
determine the similarity level of 
each scenario 
Recall bias In a within-subject design, participants 
encounter a particular domain more than 
once 
Implemented detailed constraints on 
domain re-use 
Limited attention bias  Overuse of time and attention resources 
might bias the results 
Implemented a mixed-design with 
incomplete cells to economize 
Grouping effects Incomplete cells might lead to grouping 
effects if the assignment of treatments co-
varies 
Counter-balanced the groups 
Instrument reliability The scenarios have not been used before Used multiple scenarios that passed 
the validity test for each condition 
TABLE 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variables Mean Std dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Evaluation of 
Need-inspired Opp. 3.05 .77         
2. Evaluation of 
Routine-inspired Opp. 2.85 .87 .20**        
3. Evaluation of 
Similar Opp. 3.15 .93 .48** .53**       
4. Evaluation of 
Distant Opp. 2.85 .67 .70** .55** .17*      
5. Gender a 1.45 .50 .21** .12 .15* .16*     
6. Founder b .07 .32 -.08 -.04 -.11 -.02 -.07    
7. Ent. Workshops c .30 .98 -.14 .03 -.00 -.14 -.20* .07   
8. Prior Netflix Exp. 1.49 .64 -.01 -.11 -.07 -.07 -.03 -.07 .05  
9. Risk-taking -.03 1.00 .16* -.03 .06 .13 -.21** .06 .09 .06 
* (p < 0.05); ** (p < 0.01); sample size = 179;  a [1: male; 2: female]; b [1: incorporated a business; 0: not]; c [1: 
attended entrepreneurship-related workshop or similar program; 0: not] 
 
TABLE 3. ANOVA Results 
Attention 
Check 
Manipulation 
Check 
 H1  
(Need – Routine) 
H2  
(Similar – Distant) 
Identified 
Domains 
Identified 
Inspiration n 
Mean 
Diff F-stat
p-
value 
Mean 
Diff F-stat 
p-
value 
Accurate Accurate 179 .196 6.935 .009 .302 14.849 .000 
Accurate All 306 .131 4.540 .034 .190 8.599 .004 
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FIGURE 1. How to Create a Need-Inspired Entrepreneurial Opportunity through Analogy 
 
FIGURE 2. How to Create a Routine-Inspired Entrepreneurial Opportunity through Analogy 
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FIGURE 3. Cognitive Distance between Two Domains of an Entrepreneurial Opportunity 
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FIGURE 4. Experimental Design with Treatment Groups 
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